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We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coali-
tion there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set.
Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We consider five generalizations of
convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and mar-
ginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game
which is not NTU exact.
Finally, we relate the classes of P-balanced, totally P-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally
convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games
to one another.
 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Convex cooperative games with transferable utility (TU) intro-
duced by Shapley (1971) arise from a wide range of applications.
Airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973), bankruptcy games
(Aumann and Maschler, 1985), sequencing games (Curiel et al.,
1989) and standard tree games (Granot et al., 1996) are all convex.
Recently, Pulido and Sánchez-Soriano (2009) studied convex
games with a coalitional structure.
Convex TU games are exact (Schmeidler, 1972). A game is exact
if for each coalition there is a core allocation such that the coalition
only gets its stand-alone value. Calleja et al. (2005) show that the
class of multi-issue allocation games coincides with the class of
non-negative exact games. Csóka et al. (2009) demonstrate that
the class of exact games equals the class of risk allocation games
with no aggregate uncertainty. Branzei et al. (2009) use exactness
as one of the properties characterizing convex multi-choice games.
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demy of Sciences for financialand a coalitional structure, then the resulting coalitional game will
be quasi balanced. Quasi balancedness is a requirement under
which their proposed solution concept, the coalitional s-value
can be defined.
Although transferable utility has proved itself to be a very valu-
able workhorse, it is a restrictive assumption, and generalizations of
convexity and exactness to the non-transferable utility case are
highly desired. Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) have extended
convexity to games with non-transferable utility (NTU) to define
ordinal and cardinal convexity, respectively. Hendrickx et al.
(2002) analyze coalition merge convexity, individual merge convex-
ity, and marginal convexity in an NTU setting. The aforementioned
five classes of NTU convex games do not coincide in general. The
only general result (restated in this paper as Theorem 2.11) is that
coalition merge convexity implies individual merge convexity,
and individual merge convexity implies marginal convexity.
In this paper we generalize exactness to the NTU setting. An
NTU game is exact if for each coalition there is a core element on
the boundary of its payoff set, meaning that this coalition does
not necessarily benefit from the gains of forming the grand coali-
tion in an allocation which is robust against all coalitional devia-
tions. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual
merge, and marginal convexity implies NTU exactness. We provide
an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with the nota-
tion and the necessary definitions for TU and NTU games. In Sec-
tion 3 we define NTU exactness and from this perspective
analyze the five classes of NTU convex games. In Section 4 we con-
clude by relating the various classes of NTU games to one another.
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Let N = {1, . . .,n} denote the finite set of players, 2N = {CjC # N} is
the power set of N, N ¼ 2N n f;g is the collection of coalitions, the
non-empty subsets of N. Let R denote the set of all real numbers.
RN is the n-dimensional Euclidean space generated by the set of
players. An element of RN is denoted by a vector x = (xi)i2N. For a
coalition C 2 N , let xC = (xi)i2C denote the restriction of x on C. For
x; y 2 RN; y P x denotes yi P xi for all i 2 N, and y x denotes
yi > xi for all i 2 N.
For a set A # RN , the symbols clA, @A and intA denote, respec-
tively, the closure, the boundary and the interior of A. For
x 2 RN; x 2 clA if there exists a sequence ðxkÞk2N with x
k 2 A for
all k 2 N and ðxkÞk2N ! x; x 2 @A if x 2 clA \ clðRN n AÞ; and x 2 intA
if x 2 An@A.
2.1. Transferable utility games
A value function v : 2N ! R satisfying v(;) = 0 gives rise to a
cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game, for short)
(N,v). Let CTU denote the set of TU games with player set N. A util-
ity allocation is a vector x 2 RN , where xi is the payoff of player
i 2 N. For a coalition C 2 N , let xðCÞ ¼
P
i2Cxi. An allocation x 2 RN
is called efficient if x(N) = v(N), individually rational if xi P v({i})
for all i 2 N, and coalitionally rational if x(C) P v(C) for all C 2 N .
The core is the set of efficient and coalitionally rational allocations.
Shapley (1971) and Schmeidler (1972) introduce exact TU
games.
Definition 2.1. A TU game (N,v) is exact if for each C 2 2N there
exists a core allocation x such that x(C) = v(C).
Let CTUe denote the class of exact TU games with player set N.
Convex TU games (Shapley, 1971) can be defined and characterized
as follows.
Definition 2.2. A TU game (N,v) is convex if it satisfies the
following three equivalent conditions:
8S; T 2 2N : vðSÞ þ vðTÞ 6 vðS [ TÞ þ vðS \ TÞ; ð1Þ
8U 2 2N; 8S(T # N n U : vðS [ UÞ  vðSÞ 6 vðT [ UÞ  vðTÞ; ð2Þ
8i 2 N; 8S(T # N n fig : vðS [ figÞ  vðSÞ 6 vðT [ figÞ  vðTÞ: ð3Þ
Let CTUc denote the class of convex TU games with player set N.
A permutation of the players in N is a bijection r : {1, . . .,n} ? N,
where r(i) denotes which player in N is at position i, and r1(i) de-
notes the position of player i. Let RN denote the set of all permuta-
tions on N. For a permutation r 2RN, Pri ¼ fj 2 N j r1ðjÞ< r1ðiÞg
denotes the coalition of players which precede i with respect to the
order r. In a permutation r 2 RN, mri ðvÞ ¼ vðP
r
i [ figÞ  vðP
r
i Þ de-
notes the marginal contribution of player i to the preceding players,
and mrðvÞ ¼ ðmr1 ðvÞ;mr2 ðvÞ; . . . ;mrn ðvÞÞ is the vector of marginal
contributions. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) characterize con-
vex TU games as follows.
Theorem 2.3. The TU game (N,v) is convex if and only if mr(v)
belongs to the core of (N,v) for all permutations r 2RN.
Theorem 2.3 directly implies the following theorem.




For a TU game (N,v) and a coalition C 2 N the subgame (C,vC) is
obtained by restricting v to subsets of C. Following Biswas et al.
(1999), we define totally exact TU games.Definition 2.5. A TU game (N,v) is totally exact if for every C 2 N
its subgame (C,vC) is exact.
Let CTUte denote the class of totally exact TU games with player
set N. Biswas et al. (1999) show the following theorem.
Theorem 2.6. A TU game is totally exact if and only if it is convex,
that is CTUte ¼ C
TU
c .2.2. Non-transferable utility games
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU game, for
short) (N,V) is a family of sets V ¼ ðVðSÞÞS22N satisfying the follow-
ing assumptions:
Vð;Þ ¼ ;; ð4Þ
VðSÞ ¼ VpðSÞ  RNnS; where VpðSÞ# RS; for all S 2 N ; ð5Þ
0N 2 VðSÞ for all S 2 N ; ð6Þ
VðNÞ is closed; ð7Þ
if x 2 VðSÞ; y 2 RN; yS 6 xS; then y 2 VðSÞ
ðknown as comprehensivenessÞ; ð8Þ
the sets Vþp ðSÞ ¼ RSþ \ VpðSÞ are bounded for all S 2 N : ð9Þ
Let CNTU denote the set of NTU games with player set N.
The core C(V) of an NTU game (N,V) 2 CNTU consists of those ele-
ments x 2 V(N) for which it holds that there exist no S 2 N and
y 2 V(S) such that xS yS, which by comprehensiveness is equiva-
lent to x R intV(S) for any S 2 N . Therefore,




Predtetchinski and Herings (2004) define P-balancedness,
which is a necessary and sufficient condition for the core in a
non-transferable utility game to be non-empty. Let CNTUPb denote
the class of P-balanced NTU games with player set N.
For an NTU game (N,V) and a coalition S 2 N a subgame (S,VS) is
obtained by restricting V to subsets of S. It holds that VSðTÞ# RS for
all T # S. We define VS(S) = clVp(S) to have a closed payoff set for
the grand coalition in the subgame. Let CNTUt-P-b denote the class of to-
tally P-balanced NTU games with player set N, the class of games
with a non-empty core in each subgame.
There are various classifications of NTU games. For surveys see
Peleg and Sudhölter (2003) or Ichiishi (1993). We will only give
those definitions that we use later in the paper. NTU convex games
have been defined in five ways.
Definition 2.7 ( Vilkov, 1977). An NTU game (N,V) is ordinally
convex if for all S; T 2 N we have V(S) \ V(T) # V(S \ T) [ V(S [ T).
Let CNTUoc denote the class of ordinally convex NTU games with
player set N. Ordinal convexity has numerous applications. Peleg
(1984) transforms a social choice situation with a convex effectiv-
ity function into an NTU game which is ordinally convex. Demange
(1987) provides two examples: a model of public goods and a pro-
duction economy with increasing returns to scale; Masuzawa
(2003) adds N-person prisoners’ dilemma games and oligopoly
models to this class.
For S 2 N let V(S) = {x 2 V(S)jxi = 0 for all i 2 NnS} and let
V(;) = 0N. Note that V(S) = Vp(S)  {0NnS}, for all S 2 N .
Definition 2.8 (Sharkey, 1981). An NTU game (N,V) is cardinally
convex if for all S; T 2 N we have V(S) + V(T) # V(S \ T) +
V(S [ T).
Let CNTUcc denote the class of cardinally convex NTU games with
player set N.
Hendrickx et al. (2002) introduce the following three marginal-
istic interpretations of NTU convexity.
P. Csóka et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 209 (2011) 57–62 59Eq. (2) in Definition 2.2 of convexity for TU games states that for
any coalition U, the marginal contribution of U to a coalition is at
least equal to U’s contribution to a smaller coalition. The same idea
in the NTU setting is formulated as coalition merge convexity.5 Let
CNTUcmc denote the class of coalition merge convex NTU games with
player set N.
Eq. (3) in Definition 2.2 of convexity for TU games says that for
any player i, the marginal contribution of i to some coalition is at
least equal to i’s contribution to a smaller coalition. The analogous
concept in the NTU setting is called individual merge convexity.6
Let CNTUimc denote the class of individual merge convex NTU games
with player set N.
We now define the vector of marginal contributions for an NTU
game.
Definition 2.9. Consider an NTU game (N,V) and a permutation
r 2 RN. The vector of marginal contributions Mr(V) is defined by
MrrðjÞðVÞ ¼ supfyrðjÞjy 2 Vðfrð1Þ; . . . ;rðjÞgÞ;
8i 2 f1; . . . ; j 1g : yrðiÞ P MrrðiÞðVÞg
for all j 2 {1, . . .,n}.7
Theorem 2.3 suggests the following convexity notion for NTU
games.
Definition 2.10. An NTU game (N,V) is marginal convex if for all
r 2 RN we have Mr(V) 2 C(V).
Let CNTUmc denote the class of marginal convex NTU games with
player set N.
The five notions of NTU convexity are not equivalent in general.
Hendrickx et al. (2002) show that ordinal and cardinal convexity
are not related to each other and to the other three types of con-
vexity. They also provide the following theorem on the relation
of the last three convexity notions.
Theorem 2.11. If an NTU game (N,V) is coalition merge convex, then
it is individual merge convex, that is C NTUcmc # C
NTU
imc . If an NTU game




Since our definition of the NTU game is slightly different from
the one of Hendrickx et al. (2002), we provide a proof of Theorem
2.11 in the electronic supplement.
To illustrate the subtle differences between the various notions
of NTU convexity, consider the following example of an ordinally
convex NTU game which is neither cardinally, nor marginal, thus
by Theorem 2.11 nor individual merge, nor coalition merge convex.
Example 2.12 (Hendrickx et al., 2002, Example 4.1). Consider the
following NTU game with player set N = {1,2,3}. Let
VðfigÞ ¼ fx 2 R3jxi 6 0g for all i 2 N;
Vðf1;2gÞ ¼ fx 2 R3jx1 6 0; x2 6 2g;
Vðf1;3gÞ ¼ fx 2 R3jx1 þ x3 6 1g;
Vðf2;3gÞ ¼ fx 2 R3jx2; x3 6 0g;







To show that (N,V) is ordinally convex, let S; T 2 N and let
x 2 V(S) \ V(T). If S # T, T # S or S \ T = ;, then ordinal convexity5 For the definition of coalition merge convexity, we refer to the electronic
supplement.
6 For the definition of individual merge convexity, we refer to the electronic
supplement.
7 We use the convention sup(;) = 1.is easy to check. If S = {1,2} and T = {1,3}, then x1 6 0 and thus
x 2 V(S \ T). Otherwise,
P
i2Nxi 6 2, thus x 2 V(S [ T).
Cardinal convexity of (N,V) fails, since (0,2,0) 2 V({1,2}) and
(0,0,1) 2 V({1,3}), but (0,2,0) + (0,0,1) = (0,2,1) R V({1}) + V(N).
Marginal convexity of (N,V) is also not satisfied, since the vector
of marginal contributions corresponding to r = (1,2,3), Mr(V) =
(0,2,0) does not belong to the core: coalition {1,3} blocks it.
Therefore, by Theorem 2.11, (N,V) is neither individual merge, nor
coalition merge convex.
We will continue Example 2.12 in Examples 3.3 and 3.6.
3. Exact NTU games
Theorem 2.4 claims that convex TU games are exact. In this sec-
tion we generalize exactness to the NTU setting and analyze the
relationship of NTU exactness and the various notions of NTU
convexity.
Definition 3.1. An NTU game (N,V) is NTU exact if for each S 2 N
there exists a core allocation x 2 C(V) such that x 2 @V(S).
Let CNTUe denote the class of exact NTU games with player set N.
Every TU game (N,v) with v(S) P 0 for all S 2 N gives rise to an NTU
game (N,V) by defining VðSÞ ¼ fx 2 RNjxðSÞ 6 vðSÞg for all S 2 N .
Note that Assumptions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 are satisfied by (N,V). It is a
straightforward exercise to verify the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. A TU game (N,v) is exact if and only if the correspond-
ing NTU game (N,V) is NTU exact.
Note that if an NTU game (N,V) is NTU exact, then each of its
subgames has a core element, since by definition for each S 2 N
there exists a core allocation x 2 C(V) such that x 2 @V(S), and x can-
not be blocked in the subgame (S,VS) either. Thus exact NTU games
are a subset of totally P-balanced games, CNTUe # C
NTU
t-P-b.
Next, we check whether the ordinally convex NTU game in
Example 2.12 is NTU exact.
Example 3.3 (Example 2.12 continued.). The NTU game (N,V) in
Example 2.12 is NTU exact, since (0,0,2) is a core element on the
boundary of V({1}), V({2}), and V({1,2}); (2,0,0) is a core element
on the boundary of V({2}),V({3}), and V({2,3}); and (1,1,0) is a core
element on the boundary of V({1,3}).
If for all S 2 N all core elements of the subgame (S,VS) could be
extended to the core of the original game by an appropriate choice
for the elements outside S, then NTU exactness would follow
immediately from ordinal convexity, since core elements of (S,VS)
are on the boundary of V(S). Example 3.3 shows that NTU exactness
of an ordinally convex NTU game cannot be demonstrated in this
way. The core of the subgame related to coalition {1,2} is
fx 2 R2jx1 ¼ 0; 0 6 x2 6 2g. Note that only some elements in this
core can be extended to the core of the original game:
fx 2 R2jx1 ¼ 0; 0 6 x2 6 1g, since if y1 = 0, 1 < y2 6 2, y3 = 2  y2,
then coalition {1,3} blocks allocation y in the original game.
Peleg (1986) gives the following sufficient condition under
which certain core elements of a subgame in an ordinally convex
NTU game can be extended to the core of the original game.
Theorem 3.4 (Peleg, 1986, Corollary 2.10). Let (N,V) be an ordinally
convex game. Let T 2 N n fNg; z 2 VTðTÞ such that z 2 C(VT) and for
all R # T, R – T, z R clVT(R). Then there exists an allocation x 2 C(V)
such that xT = z.
In Example 3.3 let T = {1,2} and take any z 2 C(VT). Since z1 = 0,
we have that z 2 clVT({1}), hence Theorem 3.4 cannot be used to
show that ordinally convex NTU games are exact.
60 P. Csóka et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 209 (2011) 57–62To proceed, we define the notion of a reduced game for the case
where one player leaves the grand coalition. This notion of reduced
game originates from Greenberg (1985).
Definition 3.5. Take any NTU game (N,V), n P 2, and a player i 2 N.
Define:
M ¼ N n fig; m ¼ n 1;
ai ¼ supfxijx 2 VðfigÞg;
WðSÞ ¼ fx 2 RMj9b > ai such that ðx; bÞ 2 VðS [ figÞg; S # M:
PðSÞ ¼ VpðSÞ  RMnS; S # M:
Then, the reduced game (M,U) is given by:
UðSÞ ¼
fx 2 RMjðx;aiÞ 2 VðNÞg; for S ¼ M;
;; for S ¼ ;;
WðSÞ [ PðSÞ; otherwise:
8><
>:
The definition of the reduced game is illustrated in the following
example.Example 3.6 (Example 2.12 continued). If player 3 leaves the grand
coalition in Example 2.12, then the derived reduced game looks as
follows. Uðf1;2gÞ ¼ fx 2 R2jx1 þ x2 6 2g, U(;) = ;. Moreover,
Wðf1gÞ ¼ fx 2 R2jx1 < 1g;Wðf2gÞ ¼ ;, Pðf1gÞ ¼ fx 2 R2jx1 6 0g
and Pðf2gÞ ¼ fx 2 R2jx2 6 0g imply that Uðf1gÞ ¼ fx 2 R2jx1 < 1g
and Uðf2gÞ ¼ fx 2 R2jx2 6 0g.
Note that the reduced game is not zero normalized and U({1}) is
open. Moreover, all the core elements of the reduced game
fx 2 R2jx1 þ x2 ¼ 2; 1 6 x1 6 2; 0 6 x2 6 1g can be extended to a
core element of the original game by setting x3 = a3 = 0.
In general, a reduced game is not always an NTU game. How-
ever, Greenberg (1985) shows the following lemma about reduced
games of ordinally convex NTU games.
Lemma 3.7 (Greenberg, 1985). Consider an ordinally convex NTU
game (N,V). Then the reduced game (M,U) is an ordinally convex NTU
game.
In his proof Greenberg (1985) considers the setting when
VðSÞ# RNþ instead of VðSÞ# RN , for all S 2 N , but due to Assump-
tions 6 and 8 all the arguments can be carried over to our setting.
We show the following theorem.
Theorem 3.8. If an NTU game (N,V) is ordinally convex, then it is NTU
exact, that is CNTUoc # C
NTU
e .Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the cardinality of N.
Let n = 1. If an NTU game (N,V) is ordinally convex, then it is
NTU exact, since max{xjx 2 V(N)} is well defined, is on the
boundary of V(N) and belongs to the core.
Assume that the theorem holds for any game with less than n
players. We will show that it also holds for n players.
Let (N,V) be an ordinally convex NTU game with n P 2 players.
Consider some coalition S # N. We show that there exists y 2 C(V)
such that y 2 @V(S) and thereby prove that (N,V) is NTU exact.
Let i 2 S be arbitrarily chosen and let M = Nn{i}. Lemma 3.7 and
the induction hypothesis imply that the reduced game (M,U) is
NTU exact. Then let x 2 C(U) be such that x 2 @U(Sn{i}) if S – {i}, and
let x 2 C(U) be arbitrarily chosen otherwise. Moreover, let y 2 RN be
defined by yM = x and yi = ai. Then, in Step I we show that y 2 C(V),
in Step II we establish that y 2 @V(S).
Step I, y 2 C(V)
Since x 2 C(U) by definition x 2 U(M), that is y 2 V(N).Case 1: First, we show that y cannot be blocked by any coa-
lition T ( N. Suppose to the contrary that there exist b > ai,
z x and T ( N such that (z,b) 2 V(T). We consider two sub-
cases: T = M or T – M.
Case 1a: T = M. Then (z,b) 2 V(M) and by comprehensiveness
for all  > 0 we have that (z,ai  ) 2 V(M). Also, for all  > 0
we have that (z,ai  ) 2 V({i}) by the definition of ai. Ordinal
convexity implies that V(M) \ V({i}) # V(N), thus for all  > 0
we have that (z,ai  ) 2 V(N). Since V(N) is closed,
(z,ai) 2 V(N), implying that z 2 U(M), contradicting x 2 C(U).
Case 1b: T – M. If i R T, then z 2 P(T) and hence T would block
x in (M,U), contradicting x 2 C(U). If i 2 T, then Tn{i} – ;, since
b > ai implies (z,b) R V({i}). Therefore, z 2W(Tn{i}), again con-
tradicting x 2 C(U).
Case 2: Next, we show that y cannot be blocked by N either.
Otherwise there exist b > ai, z x such that (z,b) 2 V(N). It
follows using comprehensiveness that (z,ai) 2 V(N), implying
that (z,ai) 2 U(M), again contradicting x 2 C(U). Thus
y 2 C(V).
Note that the construction used shows that all core elements of
the reduced game can be extended to core elements of the origi-
nal game.
Step II. y 2 @V(S)
Recall that i is a member of S. If S = {i}, then y 2 @V({i}) by the
definition of ai. If S = N, then y 2 C(V) by Step I, which implies
that y 2 @V(N).
If S – {i} and S – N, then U(Sn{i}) = W(Sn{i}) [ P(Sn{i}) and
x 2 @U(Sn{i}). So
x 2 @ðWðS nfigÞ [ PðS nfigÞÞ
¼ clðWðS n figÞ [ PðS n figÞÞ \ clðRM nðWðS nfigÞ [ PðS
n figÞÞÞ
¼ ðclWðS nfigÞ [ clPðS nfigÞÞ \ clðRM n ðWðS n figÞ [ PðS
n figÞÞÞ
¼ ð@WðS n figÞ n intPðS n figÞÞ [ ð@PðS n figÞ n intWðS
n figÞÞ;
which implies that there are two (not exclusive) case-
s:x 2 @W(Sn{i})nintP(Sn{i}) or x 2 @P(Sn{i})nintW(Sn{i}).Case 1: x 2 @W(Sn{i})nintP(Sn{i}). Then, x 2 @W(Sn{i}) implies
x 2 clWðS n figÞ \ clðRM nWðS n figÞÞ. Since x 2 clW(Sn{i}), there
exists a sequence ðxkÞk2N with x
k 2W(Sn{i}) for all k 2 N and
ðxkÞk2N ! x. Then, by the definition of W(Sn{i}), there exists a
sequence ðbkÞk2N with b
k > ai and (xk,bk) 2 V(S) for all k 2 N. Due
to comprehensiveness (xk,ai) 2 V(S) for all k 2 N as well, and
the sequence ðxk;aiÞk2N converges to (x,ai), implying that
(x,ai) 2 clV(S). Since x 2 clðRM nWðS n figÞÞ as well, there exists
a sequence ðxkÞk2N with xk 2 RM nWðS n figÞ for all k 2 N and
ðxkÞk2N ! x, that is for all b > ai we have that ðxk; bÞ 2 RN n VðSÞ
for all k 2 N. In particular, ðxk;ai þ 1=ðkþ 1ÞÞ 2 RN n VðSÞ for all
k 2 N, and ðxk;ai þ 1=ðkþ 1ÞÞk2N ! ðx;aiÞ, implying that
ðx;aiÞ 2 clðRN n VðSÞ). So ðx;aiÞ 2 clVðSÞ \ clðRN n VðSÞ), thus
y 2 @V(S).
Case 2: x 2 @P(Sn{i})nintW(Sn{i}). By ordinal convexity of (N,V)
we have V(Sn{i}) \ V({i}) # V(S), which together with
x 2 @P(Sn{i}) implies that there exists a sequence ðxk;aki Þk2N with
ðxk;aki Þ 2 VðSÞ for all k 2 N and ðxk;aki Þk2N ! ðx;aiÞ, so
(x,ai) 2 clV(S). Since x R intW(Sn{i}), for all z x and for all
b > ai we have (z,b) R V(S). Thus there exists a sequence
ðxk;ai þ 1=ðkþ 1ÞÞk2N ! ðx;aiÞ such that ðxk;ai þ 1=ðkþ 1ÞÞ 2
RN n VðSÞ, implying that ðx;aiÞ 2 cl ðRN n VðSÞ). So ðx;aiÞ 2
clVðSÞ \ clðRN n VðSÞ), thus y 2 @V(S). h
Fig. 1. Subsets of P-balanced games.
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is not NTU exact.
Example 3.9. A cardinally convex game which is not NTU
exactConsider the following NTU game with player set N =
{1,2,3,4}. Let
VðfigÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jxi 6 0g; i 2 N;
Vðf1;2gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx1 þ x2 6 2g;
Vðf1;3gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx1; x3 6 0g;
Vðf1;4gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx1; x4 6 0g;
Vðf2;3gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx2; x3 6 0g;
Vðf2;4gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx2; x4 6 0g;
Vðf3;4gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx3; x4 6 0g;
Vðf1;2;3gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx1 þ x2 þ x3 6 4g;
Vðf1;2;4gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx1 þ x2 þ x4 6 4g;
Vðf1;3;4gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx1; x3; x4 6 0g;
Vðf2;3;4gÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx2; x3; x4 6 0g;
VðNÞ ¼ fx 2 R4jx1 þ x2 þ x3 6 4; x4 6 0g
[ fx 2 R4jx1 þ x2 þ x4 6 4; x3 6 0g
[ fx 2 R4jx1 þ x2 þ x3 þ x4 6 6; x1 6 1g:
The game (N,V) above is cardinally convex, since
(i) V({1,2,3}) + V({1,2,4}) # V({1,2}) + V(N) using the third
set in the definition of V(N). Notice that to do so we make
use of the fact that for x 2 V(N), x1 and x2 can be chosen to
be negative in order to increase the values of x3 and x4.
(ii) For all other S; T 2 N it is easy to verify that
V(S) + V(T) # V(S [ T).
However, (N,V) is not NTU exact, since there is no core alloca-
tion on the boundary of V({1,2}). To see that, assume that thereis an allocation x 2 C(V) such that x 2 @V({1,2}). Since x 2 @V({1,2}),
we have that x1 + x2 = 2. To have a core allocation, x3 P 2 should
hold to prevent blocking by coalition {1,2,3} and x4 P 2 should
hold to prevent blocking by coalition {1,2,4}. Thus x should be in
the third set in the definition of V(N), requiring that x1 6 1, which
would be blocked by player 1.
By Theorem 2.11, to verify whether the marginalistic interpre-
tations of NTU convexity imply NTU exactness, it is enough to ana-
lyze marginal convexity.
Theorem 3.10. If an NTU game (N,V) is marginal convex, then it is
NTU exact, that is CNTUmc # C
NTU
e .Proof. Consider a marginal convex NTU game (N,V), and a coali-
tion S 2 N . For exactness we have to show that there is a core ele-
ment on the boundary of V(S). Let r be a permutation such that
S 2 frð1Þ; frð1Þ; rð2Þg; frð1Þ; rð2Þ; rð3Þg; . . . ;Ng. Since (N,V) is
marginal convex, we have that MrðVÞ 2 CðVÞ. By definition,
MrðVÞ is on the boundary of V(T) for all T 2 frð1Þ; frð1Þ; rð2Þg;
frð1Þ; rð2Þ; rð3Þg; . . . ;Ng, thus it is a core element on the boundary
of V(S) as well. h
Using Theorems 2.11 and 3.10 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.11. Each of coalition merge convexity, individual merge
convexity and marginal convexity implies exactness in the NTU setting,







In this paper we have generalized exactness to games with non-
transferable utility to get the class of NTU exact games (CNTUe ). A
game is NTU exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation
on the boundary of its payoff set, meaning that this coalition does
62 P. Csóka et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 209 (2011) 57–62not necessarily benefit from the gains of forming the grand coali-
tion in an allocation which is robust against all coalitional devia-
tions. We have noted that NTU exact games are a subset of
totally P-balanced NTU games (CNTUt-P-b), having a non-empty core
in each of their subgames.
We have shown that the classes of ordinally convex (C NTUoc ),
coalition merge convex ðCNTUcmcÞ, individual merge convex ðC
NTU
imc Þ ,
and marginal convex ðCNTUmc Þ NTU games are a subset of NTU exact
games. Moreover, we have given an example of a cardinally convex
game ðCNTUcc Þ which is not NTU exact.
Hendrickx et al. (2002) show that the aforementioned five clas-
ses of NTU convex games do not coincide for more than three play-
ers. The only general relationship between these five classes
(Theorem 2.11) is that coalition merge convexity implies individ-
ual merge convexity ðCNTUcmc # C
NTU
imc Þ, and individual merge convexity
implies marginal convexity ðCNTUimc # C
NTU
mc Þ.
Theorem 2.6 claims that the class of convex TU games coincides
with the class of totally exact TU games. In the NTU setting we do
not have such a theorem. Let C NTUte denote the class of totally exact
NTU games with player set N, being NTU exact in all of their sub-
games. Since an ordinally convex game is exact, and all subgames
of an ordinally convex game are ordinally convex, we have that
CNTUoc # C
NTU
te . For marginal convex games a similar argument leads
to CNTUmc # C
NTU
te .
However, using our results it is easy to provide counterexam-
ples where NTU total exactness implies none of the NTU convexity
notions. For instance, the NTU game in Example 2.12 is ordinally
convex, and as we argued that game is totally NTU exact. But it
is neither cardinal, nor marginal, nor individual merge, nor coali-
tion merge convex. So neither cardinal, nor marginal, nor individ-
ual merge, nor coalition merge convexity is implied by total NTU
exactness in general. Hendrickx et al. (2000) provide an example
(Example 4.6 there) for an NTU game which is marginal convex
but not ordinally convex. That example can be used to show that
total NTU exactness does not imply ordinal convexity either.
We summarize the relationships between the various classes of
NTU games for more than three players in Fig. 1.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2010.08.004.References
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